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Christopher Cowie and Richard Rowland 
 
 
Sceptics claim that moral beliefs are unjustified or fail to constitute knowledge. Relativists 
claim that moral facts are contingent on time and place. Error theorists claim that moral 
judgments are systematically mistaken. Each undermines the credentials of morality in its 
own distinctive way. This volume is about an argumentative strategy that can be used to 
respond to any such view. We refer to it as the companions in guilt strategy. It works by 
showing that the arguments given for these views – scepticism, relativism, error theory or 
other views that undermine morality’s good-standing - fail. They fail because they over-
generalise. They generalise in that if they were sound, they would also undermine the 
credentials of some non-moral domain of thought or enquiry. And this is an over-
generalisation because undermining the credentials of this non-moral domain is 
independently costly or implausible. So morality lives to fight another day. 
 
Consider a very simple example of an argument of this form. Suppose that someone were to 
argue that there are no moral facts because of the widespread and pervasive nature of moral 
disagreement. This is an obvious target of a companions in guilt response. There is 
widespread and pervasive disagreement about the age of the earth. Best estimates put its age 
at approximately 4.5 billion years. Young-earthers, by contrast, estimate that it is closer to 
6000 years old. There is little sign of this disagreement coming to an end at any point soon. 
But surely this does not entail that there is no fact of the matter about how old the earth is. 
Indeed, neither side would claim otherwise. So neither should the existence of widespread 
and pervasive disagreement about moral matters entail that there are no moral facts. The 
argument for moral scepticism has been shown to over-generalise. So it should be rejected. 
The above is only a toy example (but for discussion of an argument along these lines see 
chapter 5). However, it illustrates the basic companions in guilt strategy. The use of this 
strategy is widespread in contemporary Moral Philosophy. In this collection we bring 
together thirteen purpose-written articles on its use by leading figures in the field. Each either 
reflects on or utilises the companions in guilt strategy.  
 
1. The Companions in Guilt Strategy: Its Use and Structure 
 
Contemporary use of the companions in guilt strategy is typically focused on a number of 
specific candidate companions. These include epistemology, aesthetics, prudence and 
mathematics. We will sketch some of these when summarising our contributor’s articles 
below. But before doing this it is worth thinking briefly about some of the recent precursors 
of these contemporary arguments. We focus on just two recent historical trends. These should 
help to situate the companions in guilt strategy in its contemporary context, as well as to 
provide materials for subsequent reflection on its methodology. 
 
1.1 Responding to Error: From Colour to Contemporary Metanormativity 
 
In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong J.L. Mackie presented a view that has become known 
as the moral error theory. This is the view that although moral judgments attempt to state 
moral facts there are no such facts to be stated. As such moral judgments – and those of us 
who make them – are systematically mistaken. Mackie suggested that opponents of his theory 
respond by making use of a ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. In an important passage he wrote: 
 
[T]he best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for 
companions in guilt. (Mackie 1977: 39). 
 
The challenge that Mackie set was to find an appropriate companion: a companion that could 
negate the threat posed by the error theory. In the 80’s and 90’s several candidate 
companions came to prominence. Perhaps the most influential took traditional ‘secondary 
qualities’ – most notably colour – as a companion. Colour properties, it was claimed, are 
‘response dependent’: they are constitutively dependent on the interaction of our 
‘sensibilities’ with the world. In this regard they are unlike, for example, physical or 
biological properties. Yet despite this, judgments about colour are able to sustain a degree of 
objectivity. There are standards of correctness and incorrectness for them. Roses are not blue 
just because someone thinks they are. 
 
This provides the basis for a companions in guilt argument against Mackie’s error theory. It 
shows that the constitutive dependence of a property on our sensibilities is, in principle, 
compatible with the objectivity of judgments about that property. Perhaps this can be used to 
subvert the moral error theory. Moral properties can be dependent on our sensibilities without 
a loss of moral objectivity. This point was given a particularly clear expression by John 
McDowell in his classic paper ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’: 
 
Values are not brutely there – not there independently of our sensibility – any more than 
colours are: though, as with colours this does not prevent us from supposing that they are 
there independently of any particular apparent experience of them. (McDowell 1998: 
146).i 
 
But as critics of the morality-colour analogy – notably Simon Blackburn and Crispin Wright - 
noted, the analogy between colour and morality is strained. One of the obvious issues is that 
whereas moral properties are normative or evaluative, colour properties or not. Perhaps an 
adequate companion for morality – at least against the error theory - must itself be itself in 
part normative or evaluative. This is very much the direction in which recent work on 
companions in guilt arguments has gone. This trend was arguably pre-figured by important 
work on the normativity of meaning stemming from Kripke’s rule-following puzzles.ii But 
the recent focus has been on non-moral domains of normative judgment such as prudence, 
aesthetics and epistemology. The latter has been a subject of particular focus. 
 
Much recent work in epistemology has been largely characterised by its focus on the sense in 
which epistemic judgments are normative or evaluative. It concerns how we should believe, 
or what good belief-forming strategies are. The point is nicely put by Kim in a fashion that 
clearly invites the use of a companions in guilt strategy: 
 
It is probably only a historical accident that we speak of ‘normative ethics’ but not 
‘normative epistemology’. Epistemology is a normative discipline as much as, and in the 
same sense as, ethics. (Kim 1988: 3).  
 
This is sometimes referred to as ‘the evaluative turn’ in epistemology. If it is correct, then 
epistemic judgments appear to share morality’s key troublesome property; the property that 
marks it out from colour. And, in addition to this, epistemic judgments also seem to share 
morality’s pretensions to objectivity. Suppose that one were to claim that a belief formed via 
ordinary perception is epistemically justified. This is a normative judgment. And furthermore 
it is normative in the same ‘objective’ spirit as moral judgment: a belief’s status as 
epistemically justified or unjustified is not dependent on either the desires of judgers or on 
mere social convention. So epistemic judgments are very much like moral judgments. This 
provides the basis for a powerful response to the moral error theory. It shows that a moral 
error theory would over-generalise. It would entail an epistemic error theory.  And this would 
be an over-generalisation because the epistemic error theory is clearly implausible. It is 
clearly implausible in part because if it were true there could be no reason to believe it (or 
anything else). This point received a particularly influential development – as part of a larger 
argument for moral realism – by Terence Cuneo in The Normative Web: 
 
J.L. Mackie was a moral nihilist… But he expressed no sympathy for epistemic 
nihilism… I doubt that he would’ve had much sympathy with it. For Mackie believed in 
the power of argument and reason. (Cuneo 2007: 122).iii 
 
Much recent work on companions in guilt arguments has been a response to this, targeting or 
defending either the method or substance of the epistemology-morality analogy.  
 
Whatever the fate of the morality-epistemology analogy in response to the error theory – a 
question discussed by a number of our contributors – the strategy of taking a normative yet 
non-moral domain as a companion for morality is increasingly popular. The status of both 
prudence and aesthetics are particularly interesting in this regard. There is, it seems, growing 
momentum behind a unified picture of the nature of the normative – moral, prudential, 
epistemic and aesthetic – that would seem to make arguments for the moral error theory 
generalise to normative judgment as a whole. For some this is a reason – based in the 
companions in guilt strategy - to reject the moral error theory. For others, it is a reason to 
accept a much more far-reaching error theory, though this obviously requires defence.v  Many 
of the essays in this volume work against this background: the background of appealing to 
non-moral normative judgments as a companion to combat the error theory or related views. 
 
1.2 Worries with Abstractness and Epistemology: Companions in Guilt Arguments in 
Science and Mathematics 
 
Moral knowledge seems unlike the ordinary empirical knowledge that we gain from the 
interaction of our senses with the world. This gives rise to sceptical challenges. How, if at all, 
do we gain moral knowledge? Is it even possible? The use of a companions-in-guilt style 
analogy with mathematics to respond to this sceptical worry is one of the oldest recurring 
tropes in Philosophy. This is to the fore in the classic early-modern rationalists. Consider, for 
example, Samuel Clarke: 
 
[T]is without dispute more fit and reasonable in itself, that I should preserve the Life of 
an innocent Man, that happens at any time to be in my Power… than that I should suffer 
him to perish… For a Man endued with Reason, to deny the Truth of these Things; is the 
very same thing as if a Man that understands Geometry or Arithmetick, should deny the 
most obvious and known Proportions of Lines or Numbers, and perversely contend that… 
a Square is not double to a triangle of equal base and height. (Clarke 1738: 609).vi 
 
Although the terms in which the sceptical challenge are given have changed since Clarke’s 
day, the basic worry - and companions in guilt response - is still very much in-play. The 
traditional sceptical argument is now probably most commonly framed as an ‘access’ 
problem. Moral properties are plausibly ‘abstract’: they are neither located in space and time 
nor are they causally efficacious with respect to ordinary natural phenomena. How, given 
this, can we have the epistemological access to them that we would need in order for our 
beliefs about them to be justified or constitute knowledge? Absent a persuasive answer, 
moral scepticism threatens. 
 
At this point the analogy with mathematics becomes relevant. Mathematical objects are also 
abstract. This could provide the basis for a companions in guilt argument. If the access 
challenge entails moral scepticism, then it entails mathematical scepticism too. So the 
argument for moral scepticism is an over-generalisation. So it fails. 
 
There are a number of very different ways of running this argument. Consider for example 
T.M. Scanlon’s recent response to the access challenge for morality. Scanlon’s concern is 
with how, given their abstract nature, we could reason about, and come to have knowledge 
of, moral – and more generally normative – matters. His solution is to present a simple, 
independently plausible picture of how we can reason about mathematics. The basic model is 
then applied to morality. He writes:   
 
[W]e ... discover normative truths and mathematical truths simply by thinking about these 
subjects in the right way. (Scanlon 2014: 70). 
 
Quite aside from the details of Scanlon’s proposal – which we do not discuss here - there are 
several obvious objections to the use of an analogy with mathematics to undermine moral 
scepticism. 
 
One line of objection is that scepticism about access to abstract mathematical objects is not as 
implausible as one might think. This is evidenced by the fact that the access challenge has 
been independently developed in the Philosophy of Mathematics under the label the ‘Field-
Bencaerraf Challenge’.vii A second line of objection is that the simple companions in guilt 
response fails to address a significant disanalogy between the epistemologies of morality and 
mathematics respectively. Mathematical facts, unlike moral facts, appear to figure 
indispensably in the best (scientific) explanation of ordinary phenomena. This means that 
mathematical judgments receive indirect justification that moral judgments do not.viii As 
such, the companionship between moral and mathematical is undermined.ix This point in 
particular – and whether it is relevant to the resolution of the access challenge - has been 
much-discussed in the recent literature.  
 
However this argument resolves, the use of the companions in guilt strategy in morality and 
mathematics has proved – and will not doubt continue to prove – fruitful on all sides. 
 
2. Structure, Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
The above examples illustrate some of the most compelling and influential uses of the 
companions in guilt strategy in the recent literature. They also serve as a useful departure 
point from which to think about the methodology of companions in guilt argumentation itself. 
What, more precisely, is the structure of companions in guilt arguments? Why are they  
of particular interest? What are their strengths and weaknesses? 
 
Structurally, companions in guilt arguments – at least of the most straightforward sort - make 
two claims.x The first we can call the companionship claim. It is that the candidate 
companion really is a companion in the relevant way. This will be the case if and only if the 
argument for moral scepticism, relativism, error theory – or whatever other view of morality 
is at issue – would generalise here too. So, for example, I argued above that perhaps colour 
judgments are not a good companion for moral judgment. This is because the argument for 
moral error theory would not generalise to an argument for an error theory of colour 
judgments. By contrast, it is much more plausible that epistemic judgments really are a good 
companion for moral judgment. The argument for a moral error theory really does look like it 
might generalise to an epistemic error theory. 
 
The second claim we can call the costliness claim. It is that the generalisation of the argument 
in the moral domain is an over-generalisation: sufficiently so to count against the soundness 
of that argument. Here again, epistemic judgments fare well. If the argument for a moral error 
theory does generalise to an epistemic error theory, this is potentially extremely costly. The 
mathematical case also fares well here. Suppose that the argument for moral scepticism 
entailed mathematical scepticism. This would be a high price to pay. Mathematical 
scepticism is deeply unattractive.  
 
What, then, are the strengths and weaknesses of arguing via a companions in guilt strategy? 
One obvious strength is dialectical. A defender of the companions in guilt strategy doesn’t 
outright deny any of the premises of her interlocutor’s argument. Rather, she shows that if 
that argument were sound it would generalise in an implausible fashion. And crucially the 
implausibility of this generalisation is, ideally at least, something that her interlocutor can 
accept quite independently of her existing commitments.  Another obvious strength is that 
companions in guilt arguments can help us to see the woods for the trees in the many twists 
and turns of metaethical argumentation. A nice illustration of this comes in the context of 
using mathematical judgment as a companion against sceptical arguments. Sceptical 
arguments in moral philosophy are extremely complex and the rules for how to assess them 
are often unclear. As such, it can be hard to know which way to go. It can be easy to lose 
one’s sense of direction. But consider, if the sceptical argument at issue does generalise to the 
mathematical domain, then scepticism about mathematical judgment is true. This is a drastic 
result. It may provide exactly the kind of bigger picture perspective needed.  
 
Despite these strengths, the companions in guilt strategy also has obvious weaknesses or 
drawbacks. One obvious weakness concerns what companions in guilt arguments don’t tell 
us. Firstly, they don’t tell us where the argument against which they are targeted fails. To see 
this suppose that a companions in guilt strategy succeeds in showing that the argument for the 
moral error theory generalises to an error theory of epistemic judgment, and suppose 
furthermore that this is an over-generalisation. We can conclude that the argument for moral 
error theory is unsound. But we don’t know where its unsoundness lies. We don’t know 
which premise of the argument is false. We only know that one of the premises is false. In 
this respect companions in guilt arguments give us only limited information. Secondly, 
companions in guilt arguments – at least as I have characterised them – only make a negative 
claim. They tell us that arguments for (e.g.) moral scepticism or moral error theory are 
unsound. But they don’t tell us anything about what the correct view is. This is another 
respect in which the information that they provide is limited.  
 
The third and final drawback of companions in guilt arguments – and perhaps the most 
interesting – is dialectical. Companions in guilt arguments can be read either as a modus 
ponens or a modus tollens. Consider, for example, the use of the companions in guilt 
argument to show that arguments for moral scepticism fail because they generalise to the 
mathematical domain. This is a modus ponens reading. Simply put: 
 
1. If moral scepticism, then mathematical scepticism. 
2. Not mathematical scepticism. 
3. (1, 2) Not moral scepticism. 
 
Consider, however, a different way of interpreting the first premise of the argument. Perhaps 
it shows that mathematical scepticism is in fact – surprisingly – true after all. So interpreted, 
we really have the following modus tollens: 
 
1. If moral scepticism, then mathematical scepticism. 
2. Moral scepticism. 
3. (1, 2) Mathematical scepticism. 
 
So rather than showing that scepticism is false across the board, it actually shows that 
scepticism is true across the board. This is exactly the opposite of the intended conclusion of 
companions in guilt reasoning. On a dialectical level, which of these readings one chooses 
will depend on how one assesses the relative strengths of the case for moral scepticism and 
against mathematical scepticism respectively. This is an interesting feature of companions in 
guilt arguments that has been exploited by opponents.  
 
So arguing via a companions in guilt strategy has both strengths and weaknesses. But there is 
little doubt that it can be hugely informative and illuminating. The use of a companions in 
guilt strategy—successful or unsuccessful—can help to clarify the (supposedly) problematic 
nature of morality, the companion domain itself, and the relation between them. There is 
much to learn. Each of the essays collected in this volume illustrate this point in their own 
way. It is to these that we now turn. 
 
3.   The Volume 
 
The articles are divided into five parts: Methodology; Normativity and Error Theory; Moral 
Epistemology; Alternative Companions: Morality, Mathematics and Aesthetics. 
 
3.1 Methodology  
 
The first section addresses methodological questions. What exactly are the methodological 
commitments of the companions in guilt strategy? Is it a unified strategy, or are there 
properly distinct argument-types that fall under this label? These – and other methodological 
questions - have been prominent in recent critical examinations of the companions in guilt 
strategy. In the first section, Hallvard Lillehammer and Louise Hanson present fresh 
perspectives on them.  
 
In Companions in Guilt: Argument for Ethical Objectivity Lillehammer distinguished 
between two kinds of companions in guilt strategy: by analogy, and by entailment. 
Arguments by analogy work by showing that morality and some non-moral companion 
domain share a relevant ‘problematic feature’. For example, both moral judgment and 
aesthetic judgment share the share the feature of being subject to widespread disagreement. 
Arguments by entailment work by showing that there is some non-analogical entailment 
relation between morality and its companion. For example, perhaps scientific theorising 
presupposes the truth of some moral judgment. This non-analogical relation—
presupposition—could vindicate a body of moral judgment in companions in guilt fashion. In 
his contribution to this volume, Lillehammer identifies a new kind of companions in guilt 
argument: argument by absorption. Companions in guilt arguments by absorption work by 
showing that morality is part of some non-moral domain. Lillehammer identifies two 
examples of this kind of companions in guilt argument. The first is from Renford 
Bambrough’s neglected Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge. The second is from  
Russ Shafer-Landau’s ‘Ethics as Philosophy A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism’. 
Lillehammer clearly articulates this argumentative strategy as a third type of companions in 
guilt argument and assesses its strengths and weaknesses using the above examples. He 
concludes that the strategy of arguing ‘by absorption inherits the weaknesses of both analogy-
based and entailment-based strategies. 
 
Louise Hanson’s contribution also concerns the methodology of companions in guilt 
arguments. She takes as her departure point a recent source of scepticism about the 
companions in guilt strategy: Christopher Cowie’s ‘Why Companions in Guilt Arguments 
Won’t Work.’ Cowie argued that companions in guilt arguments couldn’t succeed. They 
couldn’t succeed, he claimed, because they faced a dilemma: they are either unsound or 
dialectically redundant. Hanson takes issue with this argument. She claims that companions 
in guilt arguments can succeed and that Cowie’s dilemma is unsuccessful. She does so by 
distinguishing between two different ways in which companions in guilt arguments can be 
understood. One is metaphysical, the other is dialectical. By distinguishing between these two 
varieties of companions in guilt strategy, she claims, Cowie’s dilemma can be rebutted. 
Hanson demonstrates this distinction – between metaphysical and dialectical readings of the 
companions in guilt argument – by presenting her own example of a companions in guilt 
argument: an example that concerns the problem that moral deference causes for moral 
realists. 
 
3.2 Normativity and Error Theory 
 
Many companions in guilt arguments focus on the normativity of morality. They argue that 
other domains share a similar essential normativity. For instance, according to the epistemic 
companions in guilt argument, if there are any instances of knowledge or justified belief, 
there are epistemic reasons, and epistemic reasons have the categorical or irreducible 
normativity that gives rise to error theorists’ scepticism about morality. In the second section 
Richard Joyce, Jonas Olson, and Wouter Kalf, who have all written books defending the error 
theory, respond to such normative companions in guilt arguments.  
 
In his contribution, Richard Joyce responds to the epistemic companions in guilt argument. 
Joyce argues that proponents of this argument assume that the error theory is comprised of a 
single argument, which he calls the argument from reasons. According to this argument, there 
are no categorical or irreducibly normative reasons. There are moral properties only if there 
are such reasons. So, there are no moral properties. But according to Joyce, the case for the 
error theory is made up of a complex web of interlocking arguments. Once we see this and 
that the argument from reasons is insufficient to establish an error theory about morality, we 
can see a route to a dis-analogy between moral and epistemic normativity. This breaks the 
epistemic companions in guilt argument. 
 
According to Joyce, arguments from moral disagreement and evolutionary debunking form 
part of error theorists’ more complex argument against morality. But disagreement-based and 
evolutionary debunking arguments cannot be levelled against epistemic normativity. 
Furthermore, Joyce argues that instrumentalism is plausible about epistemic normativity but 
not about moral normativity. And Joyce argues that an analogue of error theorists’ Humean 
objectification thesis about moral psychology cannot be told regarding epistemic normativity. 
Joyce finishes his piece by articulating a list of disanalogies between the moral and epistemic 
domains including the connection of the former domain to free will and desert and problems 
with moral deference that he claims are not mirrored by problems with epistemic deference. 
 
Joyce’s argument presents an interesting challenge for moral error theorists going forward: 
can they provide a detailed defence of the moral error theory on the grounds of one of the 
many disanalogies between morality and epistemology that Joyce identifies, rather than 
resting their case on the ‘argument from reasons’? One issue concerns the need to show that 
the properties of morality that Joyce identifies in his list of disanalogies are essential to it. For 
example, moral error theorists may wish to follow Joyce and rest part of their case for the 
error theory on the claim that free will and desert are tied to moral but not epistemic 
normativity. But if they wish to do this, they must do something that they have yet done: 
show that morality is essentially connected to free will and/or desert and that epistemic 
normativity is not. ‘ 
 
Terence Cuneo was one of the first philosophers to fully develop the epistemic companions 
in guilt argument against the error theory. In Speech and Morality Cuneo makes a different 
companions in guilt argument against the error theory. According to this argument, the best 
explanation of what makes a speech act an assertion, a promise, or a command, involves the 
existence of moral properties. But we do sometimes assert things, promise that we’ll do 
things, and command others to do things. So, there are moral properties. The companions 
here are illocutionary speech acts: assertions, commands, and promises. In his contribution, 
Jonas Olson provides one of the first sustained discussions and critiques of Cuneo’s 
illocutionary companions in guilt argument. Olson argues that this argument fails because 
Cuneo’s normative/moral theory of speech faces a problematic dilemma. Depending on how 
it is interpereted it either viciously circular or extensionally inadequate. And without this 
normative/moral theory of speech, Cuneo’s companions in guilt argument fails.  
 
Recently Guy Fletcher has articulated a new companions in guilt argument against the error 
theory from prudential normativity (Fletcher 2018, 2019). Fletcher argues that if the 
arguments for the moral error theory succeed, then analogous arguments will favour an error 
theory about prudential normativity. According to a prudential error theory nothing is ever 
good for us and we never have prudential reasons to do things (such as to take steps to ensure 
that we are happy and well in the future). But it is implausible to hold that there is nothing 
that is good for us and that we have no prudential reasons to do things. So, we should reject 
the moral error theory. Fletcher argues that this prudential companions in guilt argument is 
superior to the recently popular epistemic companions in guilt argument because prudential 
normativity cannot be reduced to unproblematic natural facts but epistemic normativity can 
be.xi In his contribution to this volume Wouter Kalf responds to Fletcher’s prudential 
companions in guilt argument. Fletcher argues that epistemic normativity can be reductively 
analysed in terms of truth but prudential normativity cannot be reductively analysed in terms 
of another property. Kalf argues that if epistemic normativity can be analysed in terms of 
truth, then prudential normativity can be analysed in terms of pleasure. He also argues that a 
moral and prudential error theory is plausible. One key problem with adopting an epistemic 
error theory is that it seems to leave one unable to make any arguments. But there are no 
similar problems with adopting a prudential error theory. 
 
3.3 Alternative Companions: Mathematics and Aesthetics 
 
The third section focuses on companions in guilt arguments that draw on mathematics and 
aesthetics as companions. In this section, arguments of this kind are discussed by Justin 
Clarke-Doane, Ramon Das, Christopher Cowie and Daan Evers 
 
Justin Clarke-Doane has written a series of important articles that draw comparisons between 
metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics.xvii In his contribution to this volume Clarke-
Doane motivates a pluralist view of mathematical ontology and asks whether this is 
applicable in the moral domain. Pluralism about an area is the view that there are a plurality 
of different concepts within that area, all of which can be satisfied and none of which is 
really true at the exclusion of the other. Such a view might be plausible in mathematics. The 
theorems of seemingly incompatible mathematical systems – most obviously, systems 
formulated with differing axioms - may both be true. There is nothing more to be said about 
which theory is really true. Might pluralism be true of the moral domain? If so, competing 
moral theories – such as utilitarianism and contractualism – could both be true. Clarke-Doane 
argues that, unlike the mathematical domain, pluralism could not be the whole story in the 
moral domain. It would still leave an important question unanswered: the question of what to 
do. This has important ramifications. For one, the interesting questions of moral philosophy 
are not fully settled by the kind of abstract ontological considerations that could settle 
interesting questions in mathematics (and other abstract domains of inquiry). 
 
Ramon Das – who has used the companions in guilt strategy against moral error theorists on 
several occasions - replies to Clarke-Doane’s argument directly. He rejects the disanalogy 
that Clarke-Doane’ claims to have established between the prospects for pluralism in the 
moral and the mathematical domains respectively. He does so by using a companions in guilt 
strategy. He argues that questions of what to do arise no more or no less for moral pluralists 
than questions of what to believe arise for mathematical pluralists. Das divides his argument 
for this into two sections: a ‘companions in guilt’ section and a ‘companions in innocence’ 
section. In the first section – the companions in guilt section – Das argues that if moral 
pluralism problematically leaves open a question of what to do, then mathematical pluralism 
problematically leaves open a question of what to believe. In the course of establishing this 
Das makes the case for thinking that Clarke-Doane’s ‘residual’ question of what to do should 
in fact be read as a straightforward normative question about what one ought to do, where the 
‘ought’ is an ‘all things considered ought’. In the second section – the companions in 
innocence section - Das argues that if mathematical pluralism does not problematically leave 
open the question of what to believe, then moral pluralism does not problematically leave 
open the question of what to do either.  
 
Like Das, Christopher Cowie responds to Clarke-Doane’s work on the morality-mathematics 
analogy. In earlier work Clarke-Doane has defended moral judgment against debunking 
arguments by appealing to a modal reading of those arguments. Moral debunking arguments 
work, he has argued, only if they undermine the ‘modal security’ of our moral beliefs. And, 
he has argued, they fail to do so. Specifically, he has argued that moral beliefs are just as 
modally secure as mathematical beliefs. Cowie focuses on an emerging line of response to 
this view. According to this emerging line of response it is mistaken to understand debunking 
challenges in terms of modal security. Rather, we should understand them in explanatory 
terms. Cowie sets out the basic case for this. He asks whether, if we do understand debunking 
arguments in this way, they are still equally (in)effective when applied to the moral and 
mathematical domains respectively. He concludes that, perhaps surprisingly, they are.  
 
Daan Evers discusses the prospects for companions in guilt arguments that take aesthetic 
judgments or properties as a companion for their moral counterparts. Evers starts from an 
assumption about the nature of moral judgments. The assumption is that moral judgments 
concern mind-independent, non-natural entities. With this assumption in place, he asks 
whether aesthetic judgments could serve as a companion. If they are to do so, Evers argues, it 
would be necessary to show – at a minimum - that ‘dispositional’ accounts of aesthetic 
judgment according which aesthetic judgments report the dispositions of suitably 
characterised observers – are false. This would open up the space for companionship between 
moral and aesthetic judgment. Showing that this space should be occupied, however, Evers 
argues, requires a close examination of the phenomenology of aesthetic judgment. It would 
be necessary to show that the phenomenology of aesthetic judgment supports the view that 
aesthetic judgments do not merely report the dispositions of suitable observers and instead 
concern mind-independent, non-natural entities. While Evers is somewhat sympathetic to this 
view, he concludes that the case for it is insufficient. As a result, companions in guilt 
arguments that take aesthetic judgments as a companion for moral judgment fail. Evers 
concludes by considering two example instances of arguments of this kind. 
 
3.4 Moral Epistemology  
 
The fourth section focusses on companions in guilt arguments in moral epistemology. These 
arguments target the position that we cannot have moral knowledge or that a particular story 
about moral knowledge is implausible. They use our perceptual or other knowledge of the 
external world, our knowledge of facts about history, or other non-moral knowledge as a 
companion for moral knowledge. In this section James Lenman and Richard Rowland discuss 
two such companions in guilt arguments and Anna Bergqvist makes her own.. 
 
Michael Huemer is one of the major contemporary defenders of intuitionistic moral realism. 
He argues that we can know moral truths by direct intuition.xviii The idea that we have access 
to moral truths via a faculty of intuition can seem implausible or extremely weird (‘queer’, 
Mackie called it).xix Huemer argues that scepticism about access to moral facts via moral 
intuition generalizes to scepticism about access to the physical world via perception. In his 
contribution to this volume James Lenman takes on Huemer’s perceptual companions in guilt 
argument. He argues that we can tell a naturalistic story about perceptual processes. And that 
such a naturalistic story provides a better explanation of our experiences than alternative 
skeptical and idealist stories. But there is no such parallel plausible account of the nature of a 
supposed faculty of moral intuition to be given. Lenman also argues that middle-ground 
positions that steer a course between the Scylla of ‘stark raving realism’ and the Charybdis of 
all-out scepticism are more plausible in the case of morality than they are regarding the 
external world. He argues that constructivist positions about the external world, such as 
Berkeleyan idealism, face problems that are not faced by Rawlsian constructivist positions 
about morality. This contrast also undermines a companions in guilt argument that takes 
realism about the external world as a companion in guilt for robust moral realism. 
 
Henry Sidgwick and Derek Parfit both acknowledged that disagreements with our epistemic 
equals about morality may seem to lead to moral scepticism: the view that we have little or 
no moral knowledge.xx Sarah McGrath has argued that moral disagreement does in fact lead 
to such moral scepticism.xxi In his contribution, Richard Rowland discusses companions in 
guilt arguments against such scepticism made by Jason Decker and Daniel Groll.xxii Decker 
and Groll take our knowledge that the world is millions of years old and Marilyn vos 
Savant’s knowledge of probabilities as companions for moral knowledge. Rowland argues 
that the disagreement-based case for moral scepticism can be revised in a way that evades 
Decker and Groll’s arguments. This can be done, he argues, once we realize that we can have 
knowledge in the face of disagreement when our view is: more qualitatively parsimonious 
than the view of those with whom we disagree; or we have certain kinds of unanswered 
arguments and objections for our view and an error theory of the views of those with whom 
we disagree. 
 
In her contribution, Anna Bergqvist makes a Murdochian companions in guilt argument. She 
first criticises a companions in guilt argument from thick evaluative concepts. According to 
this argument, the core or most important moral and evaluative concepts are thick evaluative 
concepts. These are concepts such as ‘cruel’, ‘kind’, ‘lewd’, and ‘promise’. Thick evaluative 
concepts are sometimes understood as involving both a descriptive and a normative aspect: to 
say that an act was cruel is not just to say that the act was bad or wrong but is also to say 
something descriptive about the kind of act that it was. Thin evaluative concepts, such as 
‘good’, on the other hand have no descriptive aspect: to say that something is good is not to 
describe it in any way but merely to evaluate it.  But if thick concepts are the core of the 
moral and the evaluative, then adopting a scepticism about moral properties will 
overgeneralize and entail that quite ordinary claims about the world, such as that an act was a 
promise, cannot legitimately be made.  
 
Bergqvist argues that a version of this argument based on the metaphysics of the thick 
evaluative or one what it is to understand thick evaluative concepts fails. But she then 
develops a somewhat similar argument of her own based on the work of Iris Murdoch, which 
she argues succeeds where the argument from thick concepts fails. This argument grounds 
moral and evaluative concepts and properties in moral vision. Simplistically put, according to 
this argument, morality and evaluation are the product of moral experience and moral vision, 
which is the product of a particular socio-historical framework. But this vision and 
experience extends to our whole mode of living including our shared concepts and public 
language. So, if we attempt to undermine the metaphysical status of moral properties that are 
the mirror of our moral concepts, then such a view would undermine the metaphysical status 
of all properties that are the mirror of our shared concepts, public language, and mode of 
living. But this would undermine far too many properties (e.g. the property of being a person, 





Our aim in bringing this volume together is to stimulate further interest in the use of the 
companions in guilt strategy in Moral Philosophy and beyond. We are confident that the 
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